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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

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20 AUG 1951

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MEMORANDUM

From: Director of Naval Intelligence  
To: Director of Central Intelligence  
(Attn: [REDACTED])

25X1A

Subj: NIE-41: Probable Developments in the Kashmir Dispute to  
the End of 1951.

Encl: (1) Ten (10) Copies of ONI Contribution to Subject Paper  
dated 20 August 1951.

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.

*H. C. Daniel*

H. C. DANIEL  
By direction

ONI DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

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Review of this document by CIA has  
determined that

☒ CIA has no objection to declass  
☐ It contains information of CIA  
Interest that must remain  
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Authority: HR 70-2

☐ It contains nothing of CIA interest

Date 4 MARCH '81 Reviewer 018557

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OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE CONTRIBUTION TO:

NIE-41 - PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KASHMIR DISPUTE TO THE END OF 1951

III A. and IV A.

1. In its present state of development, it is not believed that indigenous naval power will prove the decisive factor in resolving any open conflict between India and Pakistan arising from the Kashmir dispute. It will, at most, remain a supporting factor.

2. Other factors being equal, the Indian Navy should be able to neutralize or destroy the Pakistan fleet in the area where both are normally concentrated - the Arabian Sea. Such a success should then enable a blockade of and limited amphibious undertakings against Pakistan's principal coastline. However, such imponderables as strategic misdirection, unexpected tactical successes and their effects on the morale of essentially non-seagoing peoples, could conceivably overcome the initial disparity in material strength.

3. Opposing Indian and Pakistan fighting ship strength may be summarized as follows:

	<u>INDIA</u>	<u>PAKISTAN</u>
Light Cruiser	1 (active)	None
Destroyers	3 ( " )	3 (active)
Frigates	6 ( " )	4 ( " )
Large Minesweepers	6 (3 active)	4 (1 active)
Lesser types & Auxiliaries	18 total	8 total

The smaller the ship, the easier it would be for either navy to bring it forth from inactive to active status.

4. Both navies suffer from the following handicaps in approximately equal measure: limited logistical facilities and resources, lack of adequate air cover, a shortage of qualified commissioned personnel and technical ratings and absence of recent operational experience.

5. In the event of limited action designed to secure all or part of Kashmir without any invasion of present Pakistan or with only limited invasion, the Indian Navy could and probably would undertake the blockade of the West Pakistan coast. Such a naval blockade, if effectively carried out, might have disastrous consequences in the long run for Pakistan as that nation does not possess any ordnance plants of its own and must import its munitions.

III C. and IV C.

1. General Indian military moves indicate military preparedness. A willingness to accept the risk of war seems to be indicated by the use of Indian military pressure for the achievement of political objectives.

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2. Pakistan is probably also in a state of military preparedness. Pakistani statements and actions indicate a willingness to use the implied threat of war to achieve political objectives and a desire to place the onus on India for refusal to arbitrate differences with Pakistan.

3. The present disposition of the two navies provides no indication of intention to initiate hostilities. The Indian Navy is, however, in a state of readiness for war. The Pakistani Navy, on the other hand, with two of its major units undergoing refit and overhaul abroad, will not be at full strength at least until the first week of September.

4. The most ideal conditions for naval operations would exist in October after the end of the monsoons; however, weather conditions would not limit operations at the present time.

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